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question:	what	 is	 terrorism?	With	 regard	 to	 the	 problem	of	 defining	 terrorism	 the	 dominant	 approach	 seeks	 to	
acknowledge	 the	 core	meaning	 “terrorism”	has	 in	 common	use.	 That	 is	why	we	 are	 going	 to	 give	 some	 various	
definitions	of	terrorism	from	which	the	ethical	problem	of	terrorism	arises.	Aftermaths	we	will	make	an	overview	of	
the	most	important	theories	and	philosophers	that	are	dealing	with	this	question.	We	will	consider	the	two	main	
approaches	 to	 this	 issue.	 Namely,	 in	 ethics	 there	 are	 two	 main	 approaches:	 consequentialist	 and	
nonconsequentialists.	 First	 ones	 are	 judging	 ethical	 issues	 based	 on	 the	 consequences	 second	 ones	 the	 moral	
status	 of	 the	 ideas	 nevertheless	 of	 their	 consequences.	 In	 the	 case	 of	 terrorism	 that	 would	 mean	 that	
consequentialists	 propose	 to	 judge	 terrorism,	 like	 everything	 else,	 in	 light	 of	 its	 consequences.	
Nonconsequentialists	 argue	 that	 its	 moral	 status	 is	 not	 simply	 a	 matter	 of	 what	 consequences,	 on	 balance,	
terrorism	has,	but	is	rather	determined,	whether	solely	or	largely,	by	what	it	is.	For	the	consequentialists,	the	test	
of	terrorism	is	what is done,	for	the	nonconsequentialists	what	the	ultimate aim	of	doing	it	is.	And	this	distinction	is	
not	merely	just	formal.	In	this	paper	we	will	clarify	those	distinctions.	
Key words: terrorism, ethics, war on terror, good, bad, consequentialist, nonconsequentialists, terrorists, West. 
	
INTRODUCTION 
Philosophers	 weren`t	 thinking	 a	 lot	 about	 terrorism	 before	 the	 terrorist	 attacks	 in	 the	 United	 States	 on	 11	
September	2001,	or	even	when	they	were	thinking	their	main	concern	was	how	to	deal	with	terrorism	not	how	to	
think	 terrorism.	 But	 after	 this	 attack	 terrorism	 was	 high	 on	 the	 philosophical	 agenda	 mainly	 manifested	 as	 an	
ethical	problem.	The	key	concern	was:	what	is	terrorism	in	its	essence	and	thus	can	terrorism	be	morally	justified?	
These	are	the	issue	that	we	are	going	to	examine	in	this	paper	too.	
But	 the	 answer	 of	 this	 crucial	 question	 of	 moral	 justification	 of	 terrorism	 largely	 depends	 on	 the	 treatment	 of	
terrorism,	i.e.	depends	on	the	answer	of	the	first	very	important	issue:	what	is	terrorism?	The	history	of	terrorism	is	










any	 relevant	 international	 organizations	 that	 is	 officially	 recognized	 by	 all	 state	members.	 Even	 as	 a	 legal	 term,	
terrorism	 is	 quite	 blurry.	 Renewed	 international	 lawyer	 Rosalyn	 Higgins	 in	 the	 coauthored	 book	 Terrorism and 




International Law	 concludes:	 “Terrorism	 is	 a	 term	without	 legal	 significance.	 It	 is	 a	merely	 a	 convenient	way	 of	
alluding	to	activities	whether	of	States	or	individuals	widely	disapproved	of	and	in	which	either	the	methods	used	
are	unlawful	or	the	targets	protected	or	both.”1		
When	 philosophers	 are	 dealing	 with	 this	 issue	 they	 are	 interested	 in	 two	 aspects	 of	 terrorism,	 i.e.	 philosophy	
focuses	 on	 two	 fundamental	 questions.	 The	 first	 is	 conceptual:	 What	 is	 terrorism?	 The	 second	 is	 moral:	 Can	
terrorism	ever	be	morally	justified?	These	are	related	questions	and	actually	the	answer	of	the	second	one	depends	
of	the	first	one.	That	 is	why	we	are	going	to	make	an	overview	of	this	effort	to	define	terrorism,	but	firstly	 from	




Terrorism,	which	 is	 a	 concept	 that	maintains	 its	presence	 in	each	period	of	 international	 relations,	 also	 takes	 its	
place	among	the	new	threats	defined	against	the	security	of	nation	state	in	this	era.	In	its	simplest	form	terrorism	
can	be	defined	 as	 “politically motivated violence”	 both	 the	history	of	 conceptualization	of	 terrorism	 is	 based	on	
quite	old,	directly	affected	by	changes	in	the	world	conjuncture	and	defined	in	different	ways	in	different	periods	of	
time.	 In	 this	 complexity	 of	 concept	 the	 definition	 of	 terror	 and	 terrorism	 can	 be	 done	 through	 using	 the	 both	
fundamental	 distinguishing	 features	 and	 reasons	 or	 consequences	 of	 terrorism	 that	 differentiate	 other	 forms	 of	
violence.	There	is	certain	number	of	distinctive	defining	features	of	terrorism	that	differentiate	it	from	other	kind	of	

























there	 is	 no	 internationally	 recognized	 definition.	 So	 far	 United Nations	 haven’t	 come	 out	 with	 definition	 of	
terrorism	that	 is	 internationally	recognized.	 It	 is	not	that	the	UN	or	 its	earlier	 incarnation,	the	League	of	Nations,	
was	not	concerned	about	terrorism.	Following	the	1934	assassination	of	King	Alexander	I	of	Yugoslavia	in	Marseilles	
by	 Croatian	 and	 Macedonian	 separatists,	 France	 proposed	 that	 the	 League	 should	 adopt	 a	 comprehensive	
convention	on	 terrorism.	 This	was	 done	on	November	 16,	 1937.	However,	 it	 restricted	 “terrorism”	only	 to	 anti-
State	acts	by	defining	 it	as	“criminal	acts	directed	against	a	State	and	 intended	or	calculated	to	create	a	state	of	
																																																						
1	R.	Higgins	and	M.	Flory,	(ed.)	International Law and Terrorism,	Routledge	London,	1997,	13  
2	 Sertaç	Başeren,	“Terörizm:	Kavramsal	Bir	Değerlendirme”,		Ü.ÖZDAĞ	ve	O.M.	ÖZTÜRK	(Der.),	Terörizm İncelemeleri,	Ankara,	
ASAM	Yayınları,	2000,	1-15,	pp.	2-3	
MOTIVE: Political TOOL: VIOLANCE PURPOSE:  To Achieve a result of fear. 
INTENT: The “benefit” that 
want from the crime 





states	 to	pass	 national	 laws.	However	 it	 never	 came	 into	 effect	 owing	 to	disputes	over	 extradition.	Also,	 armed	
freedom	struggles	to	overthrow	established	regimes	were	on	the	rise,	some	sponsored	by	other	powerful	states.		
So	far	the	UN	drew	14	legal	 instruments	(12	conventions	and	2	protocols),	describing	what	constituted	individual	
acts	 of	 terrorism3.	 The	 first	 was	 the	 1963	 Tokyo convention	 on	 “in	 flight	 safety”	 (“Convention	 on	 Offences	 and	
Certain	 other	 acts	 Committed	 on	 board	 aircraft”).	 Next	 was	 the	 convention	 against	 hijacking	 in	 1970.	 The	 first	
hijacking	was	 of	 an	EL-Al	 plane	 in	 1968	 from	Rome	by	 PLO	 (PFLP	 of	George	Habbash).	 This	 is	 called	The Hague 
convention.	 In	2010,	an	additional	protocol	–	so	called	-	Beijing protocol	 -	was	added	to	this	convention.	 In	1971,	






Since	 2000,	 the	 UN Ad Hoc Committee	 has	 been	 examining	 a	 draft	 paper	 on	 “Comprehensive Convention on 
International Terrorism”4	–	including	a	common	definition.	Even	in	the	immediate	aftermath	of	9/11	the	UN	failed	
to	adopt	the	convention,	and	the	deadlock	continues	to	this	day.	As	far	as	we	know	the	latest	effort	was	made	by	
General	Assembly	Working	Group	 -	 established	 to	 finalize	 a	draft	 convention	on	 international	 terrorism5.	But	 all	
with	which	 they	came	up	was	oral	 report!	Obviously	 the	progress	 is	unsatisfactory.	Members	of	various	political	
hues	 are	 still	 divided	 over	 what	 could	 be	 the	 exact	 definition	 of	 terrorism.	 In	 conclusion	 -	 the	 UN	 has	 no	
internationally-agreed	definition	of	terrorism	and	in	our	opinion,	it	will	be	a	miracle	if	we	arrive	at	any	acceptable	
global	definition	soon.	
The	situation	is	more	or	less	the	same	in	EU.	The Council of Europe Convention	on	the	Prevention of Terrorism	(CETS	







The	European	Union	defines	terrorism	for	legal/official	purposes	in	Art.1	of	the	Framework Decision on Combating 
















4	Measures to eliminate international terrorism (Agenda item 108) at: <http://www.un.org/en/ga/sixth/70/int_terrorism.shtml> 
5	Oral	report	of	the	Chairman	of	the	Working	Group	on	"Measures	to	eliminate	international	terrorism,"	November	13,	2015,	UN 












2. Appear	 to	 be	 intended	 (i)	 to	 intimidate	 or	 coerce	 a	 civilian	 population;	 (ii)	 to	 influence	 the	 policy	 of	 a	









lives,	 liberty	 or	 security	 in	 danger,	 or	 seeking	 to	 cause	 damage	 to	 the	 environment	 or	 to	 public	 or	 private	
installations	or	property	or	to	occupying	or	seizing	them,	or	seeking	to	jeopardize	national	resources”.	















20th	 century	 and	 especially	 in	 early	 21st	 century	 conducted	 by	 insurgent	 organizations.	 Many	 movements	 for	
national	 liberation	 from	 colonial	 rule	 resorted	 to	 it,	 either	 as	 the	 main	 method	 of	 struggle	 or	 as	 a	 tactic	
complementing	 guerrilla	 warfare.	 So	 did	 some	 separatist	 movements.	 Some	 organizations	 driven	 by	 extreme	










far	 more	 convenient	 for	 the	 States	 and	 authorities	 in	 dealing	 with	 terrorism	 than	 to	 interfere	 in	 philosophical,	






See	chapter:	MICHAEL	W.	BROUHT,	PAULINE	KAURIN:	Terrorists: Enemy Combats or Criminals (205-243)	in	Timothy	Shanahan,	
ed.	(2005),	Philosophy 9/11: Thinking about the War on terrorism.	Chicago	and	La	Sale:	Open	Court.	







A Philosophical Enquiry	 suggests:	 first	 it	 has	 to	 incorporate	 the	 paradigmatic	 instances	 of	 terrorism	 (as	 9/11	 or	
similar);	second,	the	definition	should	not	incorporate	any	moral	assessment	of	the	act	in	question;	and	third	–	“the	




definition	 before	 the	 definition	 is	 given?	 Determination	 of	 those	 cases,	 even	 such	 “obvious”	 one	 like	 9/11,	 as	
terrorism,	is	not	possible	before	given	definition	of	terrorism.	It	is	methodologically	and	logically	inconsistent.	It	is	
strange	how	this	author	does	not	see	this	fallacy.	Especially	when	having	in	mind	that	the	same	fallacy	is	immanent	
in	 the	 second	 assumption	 that	 definition	 should	 not	 incorporate	 any	 moral	 assessment,	 which	 author	 clearly	
recognize.	 Because	 incorporating	 such	 moral	 assumption	 in	 to	 definition	 itself	 has	 the	 same	 false	 logic	 that	 is	
applicable	 in	the	first	criteria	too.	One	should	first	define	what	terrorism	is	than	to	subject	 it	to	moral	 judgment.	
Very	important	is	the	third	criteria,	the	one	that	demands	distinction	between	other	violent	actions	and	terrorism	




For	that	purpose,	 lets	offer	the	first	 (we	may	say	philosophical)	definitions	of	war,	by	which	we	will	see	that	 it	 is	
quite	difficult	to	make	the	above-mentioned	distinction.	Namely,	Clausewitz	defines	war	as	a	political instrument,	
i.e.	political	goal	is	the	primary	motive	of	the	war;	hence	and	the	political	goal	of	the	war	will	be	the	measurement	
that	 determines	 the	 goal	 of	 the	military	 act.13	 He	 says:	 “war	 is	 not	merely	 a	 political	 act,	 but	 genuine	 political	
instrument,	extension	of	the	political	relationships	-	its	continuation	with	different	means.”14		
So	 the	 terrorism	 is.	 Money,	 wealth	 or	 a	 mere	 crime	 has	 nothing	 to	 do	 with	 terrorism.	 Some	 violent	 act	 to	 be	








inability	 for	 distinction,	 above-mentioned	 Schwenkenbacher	 thinks	 that	 lies	 the	 danger	 terrorism	 to	 be	morally	
justified	-	 if	one	does	not	give	a	proper	definition	 it	won’t	be	possible	to	condemn	it.	The	author	argues	that	we	
cannot	 have	morally	 credible	 views	 about	 terrorism	 if	 we	 focus	 on	 terrorism	 alone	 and	 neglect	 broader	 issues	
about	 the	 war.	 Assuming	 that	 terrorism	 is	 just	 one	 of	 many	 kinds	 of	 political	 violence,	 he	 denies	 that	 it	 is	
necessarily	wrong	and	worse	than	war.	If	terrorism	is	just	one	of	many	forms	of	political	violence	than	“terrorism	is	
not	necessarily	morally	wrong	and	not	morally	worse	than	war	and	if	war	can	be	justified	than	so	can	terrorism.”15	
Having	 in	mind	this,	one	may	say	 that	 there	 is	no	difference	between	war	and	terrorism:	and	thus	 if	war	can	be	
justified	 terrorism	can	be	 too.	That`s	why	 is	 crucial	 for	us	 to	 find	 the	difference	between	war	and	 terrorism	and	
other	forms	of	violence	respectfully.		
Than	 what	 is	 the	 difference	 between	 terrorism	 and	 war?	 And	 where	 it	 can	 be	 located?	 Let’s	 try	 to	 depict	 the	
scenery	were	both	acts	occur	in	order	to	find	that	distinction.	And	aftermath	we	will	try	to	give	few	philosophical	
definitions	of	 terrorism	by	which	 that	distinctions	will	 came	to	 the	 fore.	As	we	can	see	war	 is	a	 form	of	political	
																																																						
11	V.	Asal,	L.	De	La	Calle,		M.Findley,	and	J.Young,	“Killing	Civilians	or	Holding	Territory?	How	to	Think	about	Terrorism,”	
International Studies Review,	14,	2012,	475–497 
12	Anne	Schwenkenbacher	,	Terrorism: A Philosophical Enquiry.	London:	Palgrave	Macmillan,	2012,	7-8		
13	Karl	Von	Klauzevic	,O Ratu.	Beograd:	Vojno	delo,	1951,	44-45	
14	Ibid.,	113	
15	Anne	Schwenkenbacher	,Terrorism: A Philosophical Enquiry.	London:	Palgrave	Macmillan,	2012,	151	











just	because	 it`s	out	of	all	 rules.	Nevertheless,	who	 is	defining	 those	 rules	of	war	 (imperialistic	 countries	or	not)	
there	are	rules	of	waging	war,	there	are	not	rules	of	waging	terrorism.	And	killing	innocent	civilians	is	not	in	one	of	






terrorism.	 But	 it	 lacks	 some	 other	 essential	 elements	 of	 it.	 Like	 political	 goals	 implied	 in	 it	 for	 example,	 and	
especially	its	connection	with	innocent	victims.	That	is	why	we	are	going	to	see	some	other	definitions	offered	by	
philosophers.	
Swedish	 philosopher	 and	 a	 professor	 of	 practical	 philosophy	 at	 the	University	 of	 Kalmar,	 Per	 Bauhn	 in	 his	 book	
Ethical Aspects of Political Terrorism	gives	such	definition:	“The	performance	of	violent	acts,	directed	against	one	or	
more	persons,	 intended	by	 the	performing	agent	 to	 intimidate	one	or	more	persons	and	 thereby	 to	bring	about	
one	 or	more	 of	 the	 agent`s	 political	 goals.”17	 As	 we	 can	 see	 there	 a	 several	 constitutive	 elements	 of	 terrorism	
important	for	this	author:	1.	violent	act;	2.	 intimidation;	3.	political	goals.	This	 is	so	called	“broad”	definition	(we	
will	 discuss	 this	 later)	 that	 does	 not	 take	 in	 to	 consideration	 non-combatants,	 i.e.	 civilians	 as	 a	 core	 trait	 of	
terrorism.	But	as	we	already	mentioned	this	kind	of	definitions	are	too	broad	and	thus	contains	risk	of	confusing	
terrorism	with	war	or	other	forms	of	violence.	To	illustrate	this	just	put	word	“assassination”	as	a	definition	subject	
instead	of	 “terrorism”	and	 it	will	work	perfectly	 fine	 too:	 “Assassination	 is	 performance	of	 violent	 acts,	 directed	
against	one	or	more	persons…	etc.”		
On	the	other	side,	Primoratz	Igor,	for	example	offers	so	called	“narrow”	definition	that	includes	innocent	as	a	core	
element	 of	 terrorism,	 but	 his	 definition	 lacks	 the	 required	 political	 dimension.	 Thus,	 he	 manages	 to	 avoid	 the	
danger	of	confusing	terrorism	with	some	other	form	of	violence,	but	fail	to	avoid	some	other	confusion	because	of	
which	 this	definition	still	has	an	essential	deficiency.	He	defines	 terrorism	as:	 “The	deliberate	use	of	violence,	or	
threat	of	its	use,	against	innocent	people,	with	the	aim	of	intimidating	some	other	people	into	a	course	of	action	




they	 otherwise	 they	 would	 not	 take?	 This,	 maybe	 exaggerated	 illustration,	 is	 in	 order	 to	 illustrate	 that	 lack	 of	
political	dimension	of	terrorism	may	led	to	its	misinterpretation.	Terrorism	is	political	act	par	excellence	and	every	
definition	has	to	take	it	into	consideration.		
In	Corlett`s	book	-	Terrorism: A Philosophical Analysis the	following	definition	is	given:	“Terrorism	is	the	attempt	to	
achieve	(or	prevent)	political,	social,	economic	or	religious	change	by	actual	or	threatened	use	of	violence	against	
other	persons	or	other	person`s	property;	the	violence	(or	threat	thereof),	employed	 in	terrorism	is	aimed	partly	
destabilizing	 the	 existing	 political	 or	 social	 order,	 but	mainly	 at	 publicizing	 the	 goals	 or	 cause	 espoused	 by	 the	
terrorists	or	by	those	or	by	those	on	whose	behalf	the	terrorist	act;	often	though	not	always	terrorism	is	aimed	at	
provoking	 extreme	 counter-measures	 which	 will	 win	 public	 support	 for	 the	 terrorist	 and	 their	 cause.”19	 This	 is	
almost	complete	but	in	our	opinion	rather	complex	and	even	clumsy	definition	with	abundance	of	elements.	
																																																						
16	Donald	Black,	The Geometry of terrorism.	Sociological	Theory,	22/1,	2004,	14-25	
17	Kalmar	Per	Bauhn,	Ethical Aspects of Political Terrorism.	Lund:	Lund	University	Press,1989,	28	
18	Igor	Primoratz,	Terrorism: A philosophical Investigation,	Cambridge:	Polity	Press,2013,	34	
19	J.	Angelo	Corlett,	Terrorism: A Philosophical Analysis.	London:	Kluwer	Academic	Publisher,	2003,	167	








not	make	 restriction	 and	 they	 include	 combatants	 as	well	 as	 non-combatants	 in	 their	 definition.	 They	 object	 to	
define	terrorism	as	violence	against	innocent	persons	only.	They	argue	that	doing	so	runs	together	the	question	of	
the	nature	of	 terrorism	and	 that	 of	 it	moral	 status	 and	begs	 the	moral	 issue	by	making	 terrorism	unjustified	by	
definition.	What	is	needed	is	morally	neutral	definition,	as	above	mention	author	Schwenkenbecher	insisted	as	one	
of	 three	 criteria	 that	 have	 to	 be	met	 in	 definition.	 The	 criteria	 that	 a	 definition	 has	 to	meet	 are	 to	 be	morally	
neutral,	and	that	means	that	a	narrow	one	cannot	be	taken	into	consideration,	but	rather	a	wide	one.		
But	 it	 is	 virtually	 impossible	 to	 offer	 morally	 untainted	 definition.	We	 think	 that	 even	 broad	 type	 of	 definition	
cannot	be	morally	 indifferent	 definition	 since	 incorporates	 such	 terms	 that	 are	moral	 terms	par	 excellence.	 Like	




to	meet	 if	 we	want	 it	 to	 be	 credible:	 the	 definition	 should	 not	 incorporate	 any	moral	 assessment	 of	 the	 act	 in	
question.	On	one	side	that	means	that	narrow	definition	including	innocent	is	impossible	as	it	 is	morally	charged,	
on	 the	other	 side	we	 saw	 that	 even	broad	definition	 contains	morally	 charged	 terms	 as	well.	 Is	 this	meant	 that	
morally	neutral	definition	is	impossible?	We	think	it	is	possible!	We	think	that	narrow	definition	that	contains	term	













the	 essential	 is	 the	 use	 of	 violence	 rather	 than	 a	 threat	 of	 violence.	 They	 are	 threats	 in	 relation	 with	 the	 act,	
otherwise	they	would	not	be	considered	as	such	in	a	first	place.	So	the	act	is	primary	object	of	definition.		
Further,	the	moment	of	surprise	and	the	fact	that	no	terrorists	announce	their	act	is	distinctive	trait	from	war.	One	
might	 object	 that	 the	 war	 is	 clearly	 distinct	 from	 terrorism	 by	 the	 fact	 that	 in	 war	 a	 nations	 are	 engaged,	 in	
terrorism	aren’t.	We	agree	that	it	is	clear	demarcation	line	between	war	and	terrorism.	Full	definition	of	war	in	the	
Merriam-Webster	 Dictionary	 is	 “a	 state	 of	 usually	 open	 and	 declared	 armed	 hostile	 conflict	 between	 states	 or	
nations”.20	On	2-th	of	april	1917,	for	 instance,	President	Woodrow	Wilson	asks	Congress	to	send	U.S.	troops	 into	
battle	against	Germany	in	World	War	I.	War	is	declared	terrorism	isn’t,	and	we	consider	that	should	be	underline,	
nevertheless	 that	war	 is	 often	defined	as	 a	 conflict	 state	between	nations.	 If	we	have	 in	mind	 the	philosophical	
approach	to	war	and	the	first	given	definition	of	war	by	Clausewitz,	this	distinction	is	very	important.	Moment	of	
surprise	 and	 unexpected	 attack	 is	 what	 terrorism	 makes	 efficient	 fighting	 tool	 for	 political	 goals.	 In	 addition,	
intentionally	 targeting	 the	 non-combatants	 is	 another	 distinctive	 trait	 of	 terrorism.	 No	 war	 intends	 to	 target	
civilians.	It	is	a	conflict	between	armies	and	targeting	civilians	is	subjected	to	condemnation	as	a	breaking	the	rules	
of	warfare.	Not	because	we	presuppose	that	civilians	are	innocent	(that	has	to	be	discussed	yet	if	needed),	but	just	

















on	 terrorism.	We	may	 say	 that	 two	main	approaches	 toward	various	ethical	questions	are	distillates	 throughout	









Nonconsequentialism is	 a	 type	 of	 normative	 ethical	 theory	 that	 denies	 that	 the	 rightness	 or	 wrongness	 of	 our	
conduct	is	determined	solely	by	the	goodness	or	badness	of	the	consequences	of	our	acts	or	of	the	rules	to	which	









Adherents	of	consequentialism	 judge	 terrorism	 solely	by	 its	 consequences.	 Terrorism	 is	not	 considered	wrong	 in	
itself,	but	only	if	it	has	bad	consequences	on	balance.	Thereby	the	innocence	of	the	victims	does	not	change	that.	
As	 we	 can	 see	 he	 uses	 wide	 definition	 approach	 in	 which	 the	 innocence	 of	 victims	 makes	 no	 difference	 to	 its	
justification.	Kai	Nielsen	approaches	terrorism	as	a	consequentialist	in	ethics.	He	thinks	that	though	acts	of	violence	
are	 at	 least	 prima	 facie	wrong,	 circumstances	 can	 arise	where,	 even	 in	 democracies,	 some	 of	 them	 are	morally	







some	other	 type,	 there	will	 be	 less	 injustice,	 suffering	and	degradation	 in	 the	world	 than	would	otherwise	have	
been	the	case”22	




strong.	 Especially	 because	 it	 can	 justify	 terrorism	 widely	 defined	 where	 innocents	 are	 involved.	 But	 the	 main	
objection	 to	 this	 kind	 of	 argument	 actually	 can	 be	 the	 same	 common	 objection	 that	 can	 be	 made	 to	 any	









means”,	which	 of	 course	 can`t	 be	 justified.	No	 one	 can	 be	 sure	 that	 the	 goal	 is	morally	 important	 enough;	 any	
method	of	achieving	 it	 is	acceptable.	Namely,	how	great	has	to	be	a	good,	 to	be	good	enough	to	 justify	using	of	
terror	 and	 violence?	 Second,	 who	 can	 define	 greater	 good,	 who	 has	 a	mandate	 to	 do	 that?	 Even	 if	 these	 two	
conditions	are	acceptable	third	questions	is	not:	how	one	can	guarantee	that	at	the	and	the	good	will	be	achieved	






















cases.	Namely	 in	 the	 cases	 that	 immediate	 life	 thread	or	 total	disaster	 is	 approaching.	 This	 is	 the	 second	 line	of	
argumentation	offered	by	Michael	Walzer.	He	sets	his	argumentation	in	broader	scenery	considering	any	conflict,	
including	war.	 He	 defence	 the	 attacks	 on	 civilians	 in	 'supreme emergency'	 circumstances.	 The	 argumentation	 of	
Walzer	is	on	historical	examples,	as	it	follows:	In	early	1942,	it	seemed	that	Britain	would	be	defeated	by	Germany	
and	 that	 its	 military	 could	 not	 prevail	 while	 fighting	 in	 accordance	 with	 the	 rules	 of	 war.	 Britain	 was	 the	 only	
remaining	obstacle	to	the	subjugation	of	most	of	Europe	by	the	Nazis.	Thus,	Walzer	claims:	“that	was	an	ultimate	
threat	to	everything	decent	in	our	lives,	an	ideology	and	a	practice	of	domination	so	murderous,	so	degrading	even	
to	 those	 who	 might	 survive,	 that	 the	 consequences	 of	 its	 final	 victory	 were	 literally	 beyond	 calculation,	




but	 rather	 an	 ideological	 position	 that	 the	 only	 thing	 that	 can	 justify	 is	 imperial	 wars.	 This	 is	 the	 exact	
“argumentation”	that	supports	so-called	“just	wars”	of	Western	countries	and	their	interventions	worldwide.	Just	
wars,	 humanitarian	 interventions,	 justifiable	 democratizations	 ….	 all	 of	 these	 rests	 in	 this	 theory.	 Resorting	 to	
terrorism	in	order	to	avoid	supreme	emergency	or	moral	disaster	is	not	moral	or	amoral;	it	is	immoral	just	because	
this	statement	is	logically	wrong.	This	is	simply	wrong	just	because	no	terrorism	can	prevent	supreme	emergency!	
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